Since September 11, 2001, the growing interest in Islamic studies has led to serious inquiry about Islam’s integration with the modern global community over myriads of issues. One of the most prominent challenges to Islam is its compatibility, or lack thereof, with the most promoted form of political and social decision-making today, democracy. Another challenge involves the necessity of implementing democracy in Islamic institutional and social reform. There is a wide spectrum of views concerning this subject. Some scholars insist that Islam’s coexistence with democracy is possible, and even more insist that the implementation of democracy is a prerequisite for such reform in the modern world. Others, however, oppose the notion of democracy altogether, instead calling for more “Islamic” methods. While I do agree that Islam and democracy can go hand-in-hand, although not entirely, I do not consider democracy a necessity for social reconstruction in the Islamic world today. At the same time, I distance myself from Muslim extremist thought. In order to place my claims on solid ground, I will provide two contrasting Muslim perspectives, one that supports democracy as a compatible and necessary agent for reform and another that opposes it for the sake of a more “Islamic” method of reformation, compare and contrast the two, and attempt at finding a level ground if not settle this dispute altogether. It must be noted, however, that I am discussing Islam’s compatibility with democracy from two different Muslim perspectives, rather than from a Muslim perspective and a non-Muslim one. Moreover, the issue being discussed here involves not only the necessity of democracy in Islamic reform, but also its compatibility with Islam altogether (i.e. whether democracy can be considered “Islamic” or “anti-Islamic”).
Many Islamic scholars have argued that in order for Islam to survive in the modern world, it must coexist with modern ideologies and systems, most notably democracy. The success of Islam’s integration with democracy would prove that Islam is a religion for all epochs. This view is largely associated with some Islamic scholars, most notably Abdulaziz Sachedina, a professor of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia and whose views are by no means novel. He is amongst those who believe that democratic principles are already present in Islamic teachings and even segments of Islamic history have seen the implementation of an “Islamic” democracy, and that it is thus necessary for Islam to implement these teachings. His main argument is that the coexistence of Islam and democracy is rooted in democratic principles that can be found in Islamic teachings, and that the propagation of these values is an utter necessity; this is reflected in his constant asking of the question, “Why democracy, and why now?” (Sachedina, in Donohue, 2006) His pro-democratic stance seems to stem from his opposition to the isolationist mentality of reactionary Muslims, since he speaks out against bigoted Muslims who have a bipolarized worldview; on the same note, he points out that the isolationist policies of these fanatics are severely demoting, rather than promoting, the religion of Islam (Sachedina, in Donohue, 2006: p.307-308). He blames the rise of fanaticism on the more moderate and legitimate of Muslim intellectuals for their inaction, and fears total domination by such conservative thinkers (Sachedina, in Donohue, 2006: p.308). Sachedina also warns us, however, that we should not limit ourselves to the level of semantics, but rather to the elevated level of moral and central Islamic principles, in particular Islam’s stress on personal accountability in front of God as well as charity and social justice, another point that I strongly concur with (Sachedina, in Donohue, 2006: p.309). In addition to Sachedina’s aforementioned claims, Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman blames the current Islamic intelligentsia for not tackling modern social and economic problems – which, he claims, if solved, would ensure Islam’s coexistence with modernity, democracy and human rights – as well as not comprehensively studying all issues of Islam as opposed to the tenets and beliefs only (Rahman, 1970). Moreover, when Sachedina claims that this movement must come from within Islamic teachings, he is implying that this implementation must be done from within the framework and boundaries of Islam itself. This view is endorsed by Abdou Filaly Ansary (1999), who claims that democracy can not be forced on other nations, but rather that these nations must create foundations for democracy from their own social and cultural dimensions.
Given the so-called “necessity” of democracy in the Islamic world, the onus was on Islamic scholars to prove its compatibility conceptually. ‘Abbas Mahmoud al-Aqqad, a prominent Egyptian liberal scholar argues that in Islam, there are two concepts that allow for Islam’s cohabitation with democracy: ijma’, or consensus, and bay’a, or a pledge of allegiance (Goddard, 2002). In Aqqad’s context, ijma’ refers to the willingness of the Muslim majority of a nation to live under Shari’a, while bay’a refers to the accord upon which the Muslim populace elects their leader, or khalifah (caliph). Muhammad ‘Amara and Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali consider Islam’s compatibility with democracy in terms of al-shura (El-Solh, 1993), or a council that allows for democratic elections. Another argument for the compatibility of Islam and democracy is that both systems call for pluralism, which can lead to more understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims. Laith Kubba (1996) argues that Islam places emphasis on human dignity, freedom, and equality, which are all characteristics of democracy.
With what has been presented so far, it is still not safe to say that Islam’s coexistence with democracy is a necessary prospect, for this view has been hotly contested by many extremist and even some moderate elements of the Muslim world. Leading the fore of contemporary political Islamic fundamentalism is the renowned Egyptian scholar, Sayyid Qutb, the ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers movement. He considers democracy to be an abomination in Islamic standards (Goddard, 2002) as well as a form of Jahiliyya (Khatab, 2002). However, in this context, Jahiliyya is the rule, or hakimiyya, of man: at best, he sees Western democracy, let alone modern democracy, as a rule of the people and not of God (Khatab, 2002), and at worst a tool for the avaricious interests of the elite, which is a more apparent contradiction according to Qutb’s philosophy as it involves the subjugation of many to the selfish aims of a select few (Euben, 1997).
The logic that Sayyid Qutb follows is that Islam is a divine hakimiyya, or form of rule, and that every other political system involves human sovereignty (Shepherd, 2003). It is imperative, therefore, that God is the only Sovereign, and that sovereignty belongs to Him alone, in the form of Islam, since, according to Qutb’s interpretations of several verses from the Qur’an as well as several Ahadith, God governs all that is in the Heavens and the Earth, and that the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), was not sent as a hakim, or ruler, but as a reminder (Khatab, 2002). However, his strongest point arises from the notion that the hakim must be infallible and perfect. From there, it can be safely assumed that the hakim is perfect and complete. It comes as no surprise that Qutb considers Islam a perfect and complete system, which is quite logical in itself considering that, according to Muslims, Islam has been brought down by God, Who is Himself Perfect (Khatab, 2002). Qutb tells us that the root of divine hakimiyya is the Islamic declaration of faith itself, the Shahadah: “There is no god but The God (Allah)” (Khatab, 2002).
Furthermore, concepts such as ijma’ and shura are interpreted differently in Qutb’s works, with the latter taking a more contrasting form in Qutb’s ideology. The first concept, ijma’, is interpreted in a similar tone to ‘Aqqad’s view of Muslim consensus, save for the nature of the consensus: that sovereignty belongs to God and God Alone (Khatab, 2002). It appears that it serves a more unifying purpose in the Muslim umma, or community. Why is that? Recall ‘Aqqad’s concept of bay’a, or pledge of allegiance. The bay’a here can be regarded as the Shahadah itself, “No god but God”; this is supported by Qutb’s abstention from mixing other (contradictory) political slogans with this creed (Shepherd, 2003). As for the shura, Qutb states that the shura as a consultiation must be inspired by God’s Law, Shari’a, in the lieu of the random interests of the people (Khatab, 2002), and any consultation must therefore be carried out within the confines of Shari’a. This shouldn’t be a problem: all people today are free within the confines of the laws of their government. Shura must be implemented to prevent the rise of autocracy or theocracy, which Qutb unsurprisingly opposes as the latter’s rulers are supposed intermediaries between men and God (Khatab, 2002; Qutb, in Donuhue, 2006: p.409). This is ironic, considering the belief that fundamentalists tend to give legitimacy to autocratic regimes such as those of Saudi Arabia and Iran (Sachedina, in Donohue, 2006: p.309).
Qutb also believes that the West
For the benefit of formulating a settlement to this heated discussion, I am going to recap the main arguments from both sides and consider several significant issues that arise in these arguments. We have some Muslim scholars who argue that Islam’s coexistence and integration with democracy is not only a possibility, but also a must in order to ensure reform in the Islamic world and Islam’s survival in the global community. This is because Islam’s core principles and values of social justice, accountability, charity, pluralism, equality and humanism calls for democracy, or government through a council (shura), thereby granting freedom for all Muslims and non-Muslims. Even though I have no contention with these logical points, liberal Islamic scholars fail to address why Islam would allow political parties with different views to run in elections, even parties that are opposed to Islam’s code of law, Shari’a. However, eliminating such opposing elements would put such a system back on “Islamic” tracks: the multiplicity of interpretations of Shari’a, advocated by the Prophet (peace be upon him) as a sign of God’s Mercy on the Muslim umma (community), and the different ways one can apply the ethos of Islam can justify the variation between the parties that at their base adhere to Shari’a, and one can appeal to the Qur’anic injunction of competing with others in good works as guiding principle for Islamic democracy. Despite this notion, they still fail to debunk the faults of democracy, among them the notion that democracy at worst can be a form of mob rule, even in present times (Mueller 1992).
The fact that democracy could be a form of mob rule leads us to revise the other views in this debate, those of Islamist fundamentalists like Sayyid Qutb who argue that democracy is not compatible with Islam (Goddard, 2002) and therefore can not be relied upon as a process for reformation. As it can be a form of mob rule, it is therefore a form of human, not divine servitude, of which the latter is solely legitimized by Qutb’s interpretations. Qutb’s methods are viable only if the ijma’ is that God should be the Sovereign, and the bay’a is Islam’s creed, “No God but God”, which is echoed resoundingly in his views. This bay’a can be a source of unity for Muslims more than democracy, which involves different political parties with different and at most times conflicting views competing for power.
Qutb and Mawdudi both argue that democracy is also unnecessary. They base it on the notion that Shari’a itself can provide the framework for human rights and freedom, as well as the abolishment of all kinds of human servitude. In short, if one has a system (Shari’a in this instance) that provides the same core values as another system (in this instance, democracy), there is no need to implement this other system, especially if this latter system has considerable faults. It is further clarified by the fact that democracy is a political system, while Islam is a religion, which Qutb defines as a way of life (Qutb, in Donohue, 2006: p.411), thus making it more “complete”; however, there is the logical fallacy in that Islam and democracy are not symmetrical systems, as has been shown by this debate.
However, many of Qutb’s views have caused me to distance from him and radical fundamentalist agendas in general. Qutb’s implicit support for violent revolution (Qutb, in Donohue, 2006: p.411) is only one of them. The means that he suggests are also puritan and eliminative. Another is his highly dichotomized worldview (Shepherd, 2003). I find it contradictory to Islam’s core teachings of humanism and social justice, which were re-iterated by Sachedina’s points. Moreover, his endorsement of the establishment of Shari’a in non-Muslim nations with(out) Muslim minorities is also contradictory not only to the fact that “there should be no compulsion to religion”, but also to the fact that the majority of the people in these nations are not of the consensus that Islam should be sovereign. It must also be taken into account that certain Islamic political parties such as the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front support the use of democracy’s electoral process to attain power in order to implement their views, even though they despise it and vow not to implement this system during their “reign”, thereby further nullifying the need for democracy amongst Islamists (El-Solh, 1993). Yet, this also brings into the fore a gap in Sayyid Qutb’s philosophy. the electoral process confirms the ijma’ and allows the implementation of Shari’a in as peaceful a way as possible, thereby reducing the need for a revolution, let alone a violent one.
Moreover, norms and exceptions have to be taken into account, something that Qutb failed to do. There are instances in Islamic history where democratic principles have been enacted, but they need not be the form of Western democracy that is prevalent today, and thus need not be labeled as such. This is because there are differing levels of democracy and democratic government, depending on both the economic (liberal or conservative) and social (libertarian or authoritarian) policies implemented by that system.
The aforementioned arguments underscore the importance of reaching a resolution in this debate. In the case of an Islamic country that uses the electoral process, a group, or ‘isba, of Muslims with the Shahadah as their only creed and Islam as the basis of their movement can attain power if the consensus is that God should be Sovereign. This means that the code of Shari’a has the final word in social, educational, business, healthcare and political institutions and policies. Should the government be tyrannical and oppressive, revolution would be an answer, and would only be violent as a last resort. Even in such a situation, the ‘ijma of the populace is still a factor: people should not be forced to accept the administration of Shari’a if they do not want it, especially in countries in which Muslims are a minority. Once that party “attains” power, its members can relinquish themselves of any sovereignty and “transfer” that sovereignty to God by establishing an administration that revolves around a more complete and unified interpretation of the Shari’a and guarantees human rights and religious freedom for all people, thus bearing no contradiction with democratic principles. The key here is on the degrees of social freedom the government gives to the people. Given that Islam calls for humility on both the “ruler” and the “subjects”, decentralization of power would be favored. Furthermore, political and institutional structures will eventually involve groups of people, and can be used to keep these systems and totalities from destroying individual human dignity while also not ascribing authority to themselves; this helps mitigate the authoritarian drive that Qutb (without a doubt) legitimately fears. However, the administration in question should strictly adhere to the core principles of Islam – tolerance, charity and social justice – and at the same time apply a more complete Islamic solution to all social and economic ills of the Islamic state, a point that was advocated by Fazlur Rahman’s aforementioned points (Rahman, 1970). One should also realize the practicality of applying it in today’s volatile world in terms of social and cultural dimensions.
To sum up, Islam and democracy can coexist due to shared principles, yet the latter is of no necessity because of this very reason when it comes to reform in the Islamic world. Islam, as an ideal, is also void of the flaws in democracy, as both an ideal and historical precedent, that can lead to the serving of the interests of a select few. There should also be no compulsion when it comes to the administration of Shari’a, as well as a continued stress on social and economic justice and religious freedom. The successful implementation of this system could spell a brighter future for Islam. Although this concludes my take on this extremely complex issue, further inquiry and research is required to reach a settlement that is more elucidated, practical, and compatible with Islamic teachings, and one that both liberal Islamic scholars and fundamentalists will find common ground in.
Works Consulted
Ansary, A.F. "Muslims and Democracy." Journal of Democracy, 1999, 10(3):18-32
El-Solh, R. "Islamist Attitudes towards Democracy." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1993: 20(1):57-63
Euben, R.L. "Comparative Political Theory: An Islamic Fundamentalist Critique of Rationalism." The Journal of Politics, 1997: 59(1):28-55
Goddard, H. "Islam and Democracy." The Political Quarterly, 2002: 73(1):3-9
Khatab, S. "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb." Middle Eastern Studies, 2002, 38(3):145-170
Kubba, L. “Recognizing Pluralism.” Journal of Democracy,1996, 7(2):86-89
Mueller, J. "Democracy and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery: Elections, Equality and Minimal Human Being." American Journal of Politics, 1992, 36(4):983-1003.
Qutb, S. Jihad in the Cause of God, in Esposito, J.L., Donohue, J.J. Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006
Rahman, F. "Islam and Social Justice." Pakistan Forum, 1970, 1(1):4-5+9
Shepherd, W. E. "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of Jahiliyya." International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003. 35:521-545
Many Islamic scholars have argued that in order for Islam to survive in the modern world, it must coexist with modern ideologies and systems, most notably democracy. The success of Islam’s integration with democracy would prove that Islam is a religion for all epochs. This view is largely associated with some Islamic scholars, most notably Abdulaziz Sachedina, a professor of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia and whose views are by no means novel. He is amongst those who believe that democratic principles are already present in Islamic teachings and even segments of Islamic history have seen the implementation of an “Islamic” democracy, and that it is thus necessary for Islam to implement these teachings. His main argument is that the coexistence of Islam and democracy is rooted in democratic principles that can be found in Islamic teachings, and that the propagation of these values is an utter necessity; this is reflected in his constant asking of the question, “Why democracy, and why now?” (Sachedina, in Donohue, 2006) His pro-democratic stance seems to stem from his opposition to the isolationist mentality of reactionary Muslims, since he speaks out against bigoted Muslims who have a bipolarized worldview; on the same note, he points out that the isolationist policies of these fanatics are severely demoting, rather than promoting, the religion of Islam (Sachedina, in Donohue, 2006: p.307-308). He blames the rise of fanaticism on the more moderate and legitimate of Muslim intellectuals for their inaction, and fears total domination by such conservative thinkers (Sachedina, in Donohue, 2006: p.308). Sachedina also warns us, however, that we should not limit ourselves to the level of semantics, but rather to the elevated level of moral and central Islamic principles, in particular Islam’s stress on personal accountability in front of God as well as charity and social justice, another point that I strongly concur with (Sachedina, in Donohue, 2006: p.309). In addition to Sachedina’s aforementioned claims, Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman blames the current Islamic intelligentsia for not tackling modern social and economic problems – which, he claims, if solved, would ensure Islam’s coexistence with modernity, democracy and human rights – as well as not comprehensively studying all issues of Islam as opposed to the tenets and beliefs only (Rahman, 1970). Moreover, when Sachedina claims that this movement must come from within Islamic teachings, he is implying that this implementation must be done from within the framework and boundaries of Islam itself. This view is endorsed by Abdou Filaly Ansary (1999), who claims that democracy can not be forced on other nations, but rather that these nations must create foundations for democracy from their own social and cultural dimensions.
Given the so-called “necessity” of democracy in the Islamic world, the onus was on Islamic scholars to prove its compatibility conceptually. ‘Abbas Mahmoud al-Aqqad, a prominent Egyptian liberal scholar argues that in Islam, there are two concepts that allow for Islam’s cohabitation with democracy: ijma’, or consensus, and bay’a, or a pledge of allegiance (Goddard, 2002). In Aqqad’s context, ijma’ refers to the willingness of the Muslim majority of a nation to live under Shari’a, while bay’a refers to the accord upon which the Muslim populace elects their leader, or khalifah (caliph). Muhammad ‘Amara and Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali consider Islam’s compatibility with democracy in terms of al-shura (El-Solh, 1993), or a council that allows for democratic elections. Another argument for the compatibility of Islam and democracy is that both systems call for pluralism, which can lead to more understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims. Laith Kubba (1996) argues that Islam places emphasis on human dignity, freedom, and equality, which are all characteristics of democracy.
With what has been presented so far, it is still not safe to say that Islam’s coexistence with democracy is a necessary prospect, for this view has been hotly contested by many extremist and even some moderate elements of the Muslim world. Leading the fore of contemporary political Islamic fundamentalism is the renowned Egyptian scholar, Sayyid Qutb, the ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers movement. He considers democracy to be an abomination in Islamic standards (Goddard, 2002) as well as a form of Jahiliyya (Khatab, 2002). However, in this context, Jahiliyya is the rule, or hakimiyya, of man: at best, he sees Western democracy, let alone modern democracy, as a rule of the people and not of God (Khatab, 2002), and at worst a tool for the avaricious interests of the elite, which is a more apparent contradiction according to Qutb’s philosophy as it involves the subjugation of many to the selfish aims of a select few (Euben, 1997).
The logic that Sayyid Qutb follows is that Islam is a divine hakimiyya, or form of rule, and that every other political system involves human sovereignty (Shepherd, 2003). It is imperative, therefore, that God is the only Sovereign, and that sovereignty belongs to Him alone, in the form of Islam, since, according to Qutb’s interpretations of several verses from the Qur’an as well as several Ahadith, God governs all that is in the Heavens and the Earth, and that the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), was not sent as a hakim, or ruler, but as a reminder (Khatab, 2002). However, his strongest point arises from the notion that the hakim must be infallible and perfect. From there, it can be safely assumed that the hakim is perfect and complete. It comes as no surprise that Qutb considers Islam a perfect and complete system, which is quite logical in itself considering that, according to Muslims, Islam has been brought down by God, Who is Himself Perfect (Khatab, 2002). Qutb tells us that the root of divine hakimiyya is the Islamic declaration of faith itself, the Shahadah: “There is no god but The God (Allah)” (Khatab, 2002).
Furthermore, concepts such as ijma’ and shura are interpreted differently in Qutb’s works, with the latter taking a more contrasting form in Qutb’s ideology. The first concept, ijma’, is interpreted in a similar tone to ‘Aqqad’s view of Muslim consensus, save for the nature of the consensus: that sovereignty belongs to God and God Alone (Khatab, 2002). It appears that it serves a more unifying purpose in the Muslim umma, or community. Why is that? Recall ‘Aqqad’s concept of bay’a, or pledge of allegiance. The bay’a here can be regarded as the Shahadah itself, “No god but God”; this is supported by Qutb’s abstention from mixing other (contradictory) political slogans with this creed (Shepherd, 2003). As for the shura, Qutb states that the shura as a consultiation must be inspired by God’s Law, Shari’a, in the lieu of the random interests of the people (Khatab, 2002), and any consultation must therefore be carried out within the confines of Shari’a. This shouldn’t be a problem: all people today are free within the confines of the laws of their government. Shura must be implemented to prevent the rise of autocracy or theocracy, which Qutb unsurprisingly opposes as the latter’s rulers are supposed intermediaries between men and God (Khatab, 2002; Qutb, in Donuhue, 2006: p.409). This is ironic, considering the belief that fundamentalists tend to give legitimacy to autocratic regimes such as those of Saudi Arabia and Iran (Sachedina, in Donohue, 2006: p.309).
Qutb also believes that the West
“can no longer provide the values necessary for [the flourishing of] humanity” (Qutb, as quoted in Euben, 1997),and that Shari’a itself, as a more viable substitute, can set down guidelines for the values that are usually associated with democracy, human rights and other freedoms – a point that I personally, as a Muslim, concur with (Khatab, 2002). This leads to the discussion of how Qutb plans to implement reform in Islamic society. Qutb himself asserts that it should be done through Jihad (Qutb, in Donohue, 2006: p.409), or struggling in the cause of God. For the sake of consistency, I will only delve into what Qutb meant by the controversial word, Jihad, rather than discuss the many views surrounding it. He believes that through preaching and revolution, which need not be violent, men will be freed from their subordination to other men, and all of mankind will be subordinate only to God (Qutb, in Donohue, 2006: p.410-411). He undermines the electoral process by claiming that a small group of devoted Muslims, or ‘isba, can rally other Muslims to their cause, thereby ensuring a successful revolution. At the same time, he reminds us that this movement need not be defensive, for he underscored Islam’s commitment to wipe out all systems that call for man’s servitude to man, which he labels as part of Jahiliyya (Shepherd, 2003); however, he appeals to us in that this is a good cause, for the success of his movement would spell the freedom of man from servitude to selfish aims (Qutb, in Donohue, 2006: p.412), and that freedom of religion will be observed in such a system (Qutb, in Donohue, 2006: p.416).
For the benefit of formulating a settlement to this heated discussion, I am going to recap the main arguments from both sides and consider several significant issues that arise in these arguments. We have some Muslim scholars who argue that Islam’s coexistence and integration with democracy is not only a possibility, but also a must in order to ensure reform in the Islamic world and Islam’s survival in the global community. This is because Islam’s core principles and values of social justice, accountability, charity, pluralism, equality and humanism calls for democracy, or government through a council (shura), thereby granting freedom for all Muslims and non-Muslims. Even though I have no contention with these logical points, liberal Islamic scholars fail to address why Islam would allow political parties with different views to run in elections, even parties that are opposed to Islam’s code of law, Shari’a. However, eliminating such opposing elements would put such a system back on “Islamic” tracks: the multiplicity of interpretations of Shari’a, advocated by the Prophet (peace be upon him) as a sign of God’s Mercy on the Muslim umma (community), and the different ways one can apply the ethos of Islam can justify the variation between the parties that at their base adhere to Shari’a, and one can appeal to the Qur’anic injunction of competing with others in good works as guiding principle for Islamic democracy. Despite this notion, they still fail to debunk the faults of democracy, among them the notion that democracy at worst can be a form of mob rule, even in present times (Mueller 1992).
The fact that democracy could be a form of mob rule leads us to revise the other views in this debate, those of Islamist fundamentalists like Sayyid Qutb who argue that democracy is not compatible with Islam (Goddard, 2002) and therefore can not be relied upon as a process for reformation. As it can be a form of mob rule, it is therefore a form of human, not divine servitude, of which the latter is solely legitimized by Qutb’s interpretations. Qutb’s methods are viable only if the ijma’ is that God should be the Sovereign, and the bay’a is Islam’s creed, “No God but God”, which is echoed resoundingly in his views. This bay’a can be a source of unity for Muslims more than democracy, which involves different political parties with different and at most times conflicting views competing for power.
Qutb and Mawdudi both argue that democracy is also unnecessary. They base it on the notion that Shari’a itself can provide the framework for human rights and freedom, as well as the abolishment of all kinds of human servitude. In short, if one has a system (Shari’a in this instance) that provides the same core values as another system (in this instance, democracy), there is no need to implement this other system, especially if this latter system has considerable faults. It is further clarified by the fact that democracy is a political system, while Islam is a religion, which Qutb defines as a way of life (Qutb, in Donohue, 2006: p.411), thus making it more “complete”; however, there is the logical fallacy in that Islam and democracy are not symmetrical systems, as has been shown by this debate.
However, many of Qutb’s views have caused me to distance from him and radical fundamentalist agendas in general. Qutb’s implicit support for violent revolution (Qutb, in Donohue, 2006: p.411) is only one of them. The means that he suggests are also puritan and eliminative. Another is his highly dichotomized worldview (Shepherd, 2003). I find it contradictory to Islam’s core teachings of humanism and social justice, which were re-iterated by Sachedina’s points. Moreover, his endorsement of the establishment of Shari’a in non-Muslim nations with(out) Muslim minorities is also contradictory not only to the fact that “there should be no compulsion to religion”, but also to the fact that the majority of the people in these nations are not of the consensus that Islam should be sovereign. It must also be taken into account that certain Islamic political parties such as the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front support the use of democracy’s electoral process to attain power in order to implement their views, even though they despise it and vow not to implement this system during their “reign”, thereby further nullifying the need for democracy amongst Islamists (El-Solh, 1993). Yet, this also brings into the fore a gap in Sayyid Qutb’s philosophy. the electoral process confirms the ijma’ and allows the implementation of Shari’a in as peaceful a way as possible, thereby reducing the need for a revolution, let alone a violent one.
Moreover, norms and exceptions have to be taken into account, something that Qutb failed to do. There are instances in Islamic history where democratic principles have been enacted, but they need not be the form of Western democracy that is prevalent today, and thus need not be labeled as such. This is because there are differing levels of democracy and democratic government, depending on both the economic (liberal or conservative) and social (libertarian or authoritarian) policies implemented by that system.
The aforementioned arguments underscore the importance of reaching a resolution in this debate. In the case of an Islamic country that uses the electoral process, a group, or ‘isba, of Muslims with the Shahadah as their only creed and Islam as the basis of their movement can attain power if the consensus is that God should be Sovereign. This means that the code of Shari’a has the final word in social, educational, business, healthcare and political institutions and policies. Should the government be tyrannical and oppressive, revolution would be an answer, and would only be violent as a last resort. Even in such a situation, the ‘ijma of the populace is still a factor: people should not be forced to accept the administration of Shari’a if they do not want it, especially in countries in which Muslims are a minority. Once that party “attains” power, its members can relinquish themselves of any sovereignty and “transfer” that sovereignty to God by establishing an administration that revolves around a more complete and unified interpretation of the Shari’a and guarantees human rights and religious freedom for all people, thus bearing no contradiction with democratic principles. The key here is on the degrees of social freedom the government gives to the people. Given that Islam calls for humility on both the “ruler” and the “subjects”, decentralization of power would be favored. Furthermore, political and institutional structures will eventually involve groups of people, and can be used to keep these systems and totalities from destroying individual human dignity while also not ascribing authority to themselves; this helps mitigate the authoritarian drive that Qutb (without a doubt) legitimately fears. However, the administration in question should strictly adhere to the core principles of Islam – tolerance, charity and social justice – and at the same time apply a more complete Islamic solution to all social and economic ills of the Islamic state, a point that was advocated by Fazlur Rahman’s aforementioned points (Rahman, 1970). One should also realize the practicality of applying it in today’s volatile world in terms of social and cultural dimensions.
To sum up, Islam and democracy can coexist due to shared principles, yet the latter is of no necessity because of this very reason when it comes to reform in the Islamic world. Islam, as an ideal, is also void of the flaws in democracy, as both an ideal and historical precedent, that can lead to the serving of the interests of a select few. There should also be no compulsion when it comes to the administration of Shari’a, as well as a continued stress on social and economic justice and religious freedom. The successful implementation of this system could spell a brighter future for Islam. Although this concludes my take on this extremely complex issue, further inquiry and research is required to reach a settlement that is more elucidated, practical, and compatible with Islamic teachings, and one that both liberal Islamic scholars and fundamentalists will find common ground in.
Works Consulted
Ansary, A.F. "Muslims and Democracy." Journal of Democracy, 1999, 10(3):18-32
El-Solh, R. "Islamist Attitudes towards Democracy." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1993: 20(1):57-63
Euben, R.L. "Comparative Political Theory: An Islamic Fundamentalist Critique of Rationalism." The Journal of Politics, 1997: 59(1):28-55
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