One of the most controversial issues in all religions is the case of gender equality in religious beliefs. Unsurprisingly, Islam has faced countless criticism against its so-called “misogynist traditions” in that it is inherently a religion that is biased against women in matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance, among other things. On the other hand, apologetics and scholars alike argue that Islam is a religion in which both sexes are considered equals both under the eyes of God and in social matters. This paper will compare both approaches and attempt at resolving this question from the following perspective: that the religion of Islam is not inherently misanthropic towards women, and that this application does not require a specific social and cultural framework. This standpoint defies many obstacles, among them the rising reports of domestic violence in Islamic countries and the lack of contemporary scholarly discourse on women’s rights in these nations; at the same time, I am also taking into account that practice is distinct from doctrine even if the doctrine and practice conform to each other.
A large number of scholars argue that Islamic beliefs, exemplified by the Qur’an and Hadith, are misogynist, or bigoted towards women and their rights, especially as mothers and wives. Proponents of this argument, amongst them Family Law practitioner Nayer Honarvar, claim that the Qur’an considers men a degree (darajah) above women and commands the wife’s absolute deference to her husband’s commands, which is contradictory to the Qur’anic statement that men and women are equal (Honarvar, 1988; Qur’an, 2:228, 3:1, 4:34). This is especially true in the case of Family Law. Honarvar goes on to claim that, as a result of her biology, a housewife is restricted to child-bearing, child care and maintenance of the household, and is barred from leaving the house. In effect, women are discouraged from education and work, and can only gain economic independence through marriage (Honarvar, 1988). She claims that this stems from Qur’anic division of labor between the sexes, in which the husband obtains the family’s income via work and manages most of his households affairs, while the wife tends to raising the children and answering to her husband (Honarvar, 1988). From a historical perspective, she argues that this dominance is also rooted in the Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) choice of the patrilineal lifestyle as the basis for the Muslim family, in which the wife is restricted to breeding and caring of the household, thereby restricting her freedom of movement and right to economic independence (Honarvar, 1988). Because of this supposed male dominance over familial affairs, Honarvar concludes that the man is the focus of family law in Islam and thus disregards the independence of women let alone a legitimate means through which women can obtain such economical autonomy, hence providing ammunition to those who argue that Islamic practices are misogynistic (Honarvar, 1988).
Another area of Islamic law under constant scholarly siege is divorce. Men can make the dissolution of their marriage official by simply announcing their intent to divorce three times in a single claim; this declaration need not be written, nor be at the consent of the wife, and nor even be done in her presence (Honarvar, 1988). Women, however, can divorce via mutual consent or judicial decree, of which the latter has to be done under several circumstances, among them being the husband’s impotence, cases of any infectious venereal diseases, failure to supply economic provisions, or apostasy from Islam (Honarvar, 1988). Also, child brides who reach puberty have the choice of remaining with their husbands or leaving them (Honarvar, 1988). Despite this, women are strongly discouraged to make “play of their divorce rights”, even though men apparently can do so (Honarvar, 1988). Furthermore, upon divorce, a woman is deprived of not only companionship, but also her livelihood, (supposedly) her children (namely, males over 2 and females over 7) and purportedly her only source of income, as she has to relinquish claims to her dower as a result (Honarvar, 1988). Should she make a living, she has to remarry, beg in the streets or live as a prostitute. From an Islamic perspective, only the first option is viable, which worsens the situation of a female divorcee who can not find a suitable mate. Also, upon divorce, a woman has to wait three months before she can remarry in a period known as the ‘idda to make sure that she does not have child from her ex-husband; she is also implored to maintain her modesty and curtail interaction with males (Honarvar, 1988). The man, however, benefits with child custody, and is relatively unaffected as his source of income is his job (Honarvar, 1988). Although women’s rights are limited in marriage, it seems that the dissolution of marriage marginalizes those rights almost completely, especially when the husband is still alive.
A third issue is inheritance. While both a male and female ascendants and descendants can inherit, a woman has half the share of a man (Honarvar, 1988). This means that the more male kin a woman has, the less she and they inherit (Honarvar, 1988). Also, a woman who is permanently divorced from her husband has no claim to inheritance, even amongst her children, who can still inherit from their father (Honarvar, 1988). Once again, the woman is apparently disfavored, regardless of marital status in this case.
Before moving on to the perspective that conforms more or less to mine, I would like to point out that I have plenty of reason to believe that Honarvar’s thesis is leaning towards biased Orientalist discourse if not Orientalist itself, despite her appeals to objectivity in acknowledging the inferior status of women before the advent of Islam. Simple observation shows that most of the references are from non-Islamic sources. Orientalist discourse tends to discount the full scope of Islamic texts as legitimate sources (Said, 1985). She fails to extensively cite passages in the Qur’an and Hadith as evidence for her aforementioned claims on divorce and family law (Honarvar, 1988). Additionally, the titles of some of these sources refer to Islam as “Mohammedanism” (as is the case of H.A.R. Gibbs’ book) and Shari’a as “Mohammedan Law” (Honarvar, 1988). Orientalist sources are known for the use of the word of “Mohammedanism” to refer to Islam, which is incorrect since Islam is not about worshipping the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).
Other blemishes were found in her thesis. There are several claims that she did not cite properly, such as the claim that a wife loses custody of her children as well as visitation rights, and that the Qur’an regards men as physically and intellectually superior to women, which is untrue (Wadud, 1999); the placement of such a claim in quotation marks does not make it more convincing (Honarvar, 1988). Moreover, she tends to look more at sexual inequalities in Islamic societies than in Islamic doctrine itself. That is, rather than attacking the Islamic doctrine and ethico-spiritual principles of Islam, as she vowed to do so in her thesis, she shifts her focus on misogynyst practices and gender inequalities in Islamic societies of the past and present. For example, she cites Dr. M. Abdul-Rauf who clearly claimed from an Islamic perspective that a woman can be granted custodial rights over her children should she be morally qualified and unmarried after the divorce, to which she responds by stating that sexual inequalities in cultures would tend to dismiss such custodial rights, thereby granting them to the man (Honarvar, 1988). Note that she did not refer to the doctrine of Islam, but rather on the general case of inequalities found in all cultures and societies The rest of her flaws should be apparent as I move on to the next thesis.
Scores of Islamic scholars have argued that Islam is not biased against women in social matters. While they acknowledge that Islamic dogma comes across as misogynist on the surface, they claim that attainment of a comprehensive understanding of the Qur’an and Hadith in terms of context and content dispels such a perception (Mernissi, 1991:60-61; Smith, 1979). They argue that while men and women are equal as believers and as such committed to the same moral responsibilities required of them (Smith, 1979), the Qur’an recognizes fundamental biological and social differences between men and women, such as the ability of women to bear children (Honarvar, 1988; Wadud, 1999:70). Despite these indispensable biological inequities along with the Qur’anic preference for men as suppliers of familial income, controversial Islamic scholar and feminist Amina Wadud claims that there is no Qur’anic ruling that restricts women to the role of housewife and mother, even though she acknowledges that are preferred for her as she is best-suited for it; that is, distribution of labor does not imply inequality (Wadud, 1999:64-65). She further claims that this darajah that men have above women are for certain cases where the man is pious and supports his wife from his means, but this does not imply that men as a whole are above women as a whole (Wadud, 1999:66+68-71). In return for the wife’s obedience, the husband must in turn shoulder the burden of caring for her mental, physical and economical welfare, which means that the wife need not concern herself with familial economic affairs amongst other things (Smith, 1979). Even Honarvar admits that women are not entirely restricted to their homes, and can work and/or receive education provided that they can behave decently, attend to their maternal and house-related obligations sufficiently and work in a setting that minimizes social contact with men other than their husbands and relatives (Honarvar, 1988); single women can do this as well, but within the same confines that married women are in (Honarvar, 1988; Wadud, 1999:64-65). In fact, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) implores men and women to seek education and knowledge, regardless of marital status and age, contrary to what Honarvar asserted earlier (Hariri, 1987). Honarvar recognizes that the children of women who do not regularly attend to their maternal duties suffer from lack of proper upbringing as well, and that the intra-familial ties that bond its members can fall apart as a result, hence giving as a valid reason why the role of housewife is preferred (Honarvar, 1988). Thus, the restrictions on a married woman are not as absolute as Honarvar depicted them to be.
Returning to the already bleakly-painted picture of divorce in Islam, Honarvar did not reflect on the prospect that laws (on divorce) in essence can be deterrents (Ball, 1955). The question remains, however, what is deterred in this case. Recall Honarvar’s contention that women lose companionship (as does the man), custody rights and income. Moreover, in Islam, marriage is a contract that requires proposal on part of one party, careful consideration of the offer, and a mutual acceptance of the offer in order to ensure that the couple are willing to make their marriage work out, especially when it comes to marital disputes (Honarvar, 1988). Otherwise, divorce would be a more likely outcome. It is important, I think, that women consider such proposals as well as their potential husbands before they accept it or rush to acceptance (Smith, 1979). Thus, these divorce laws deter marital disruption, forced marriages, and hasty marriages that leave no time for consideration of the proposal. This is supported by the fact that Islam encourages men and women to marry and stay married, for marriage endorses societal chastity and cleanliness, and confines sexual pleasure to within the family (Honarvar, 1988).
The abovesaid argument can be proposed only if Honarvar’s allegations – that divorce rights are absolutely non-equitable – are true. In addition to the aforementioned rights of women regarding divorce, especially the right of divorce upon legal procedure, Wadud further cites the Qur’an in saying that divorce should be done on equitable terms without specification towards custodial rights and dowry, at the same time cautioning men on unjustly taking advantage of their wives (Wadud, 1999:78-80; Qur’an, 2:231). This seems to negate Honarvar’s earlier claims on custodial rights, for we can not know for certain. A husband is also required to support his wife during the three-month long ‘idda period, especially when he is regarded at fault (Honarvar, 1988). Moreover, men are discouraged from making “play with their divorce rights”: the Prophet (peace be upon him) said that “God does not like men and women who relish variety in sexual pleasure”. Ironically, Honarvar cited this but failed to consider its meaning as she focused on the Hadith that were aimed at women, thereby bringing into the fore another loophole in her thesis.
Following Wadud’s line of logic in the case of inheritance, it can be assumed that the double share of inheritance that men receive is compensated by the economical support of their wives and women. She further contends that the Qur’an itself does not elaborate on all possibilities of inheritance, as it requires us to take a look at the benefits of the inherited share to particulars within the family and who requires that share more than others and thereby do justice (Wadud, 1999:87-88). Also, if a woman has a brother, she is still an heir, but she receives half the share of any other man present (Wadud, 1999:87-88). As a result, the inheritance procedure does not appear clockwork and biased like it does in Honarvar’s analysis, and gives plenty of room for possibilities in which women may receive larger shares (Wadud, 1999:88).
Regardless of the rebuttal to Honarvar’s claims, Wadud is not perfect either. She seems to neglect Islamic traditions, the Ahadith , almost entirely. Proper exegesis of the Qur’an amongst mainstream Muslims involves keeping the context of the verse in mind, and the Ahadith usually serve the purpose of defining such contexts (Martin, 1982). While Honarvar rarely makes a claim based on the Qur’an, Wadud interprets the Qur’an in accordance with both the Qur’an’s “worldview” and her individual semantic “understanding” of specific words in the verses instead of relying on the consensus of the Muslim (scholarly) community, which she believes at the moment is patriarchal (and rightly so in many, but not most cases), regarding interpretation of these verses as well as the Ahadith (Wadud, 1999:62-63). Despite what I think is a much stronger argument, her work is still as subjective if not less than Honarvar’s.
The main problem today, however, lies in how Islam is practiced, not what it espouses, which is rather part of the issue that Honarvar addressed initially: the enigma of the persistence of misogyny and gender inequality in Islamic societies at the expense of the ethical and spiritual doctrines of Islam. Both Wadud and Honarvar acknowledge that Islamic societies of today, while containing equal numbers of men and women, are patriarchal in nature. The inequalities observed are rather social and cultural rather than religious (Smith, 1979). Years of colonialism and oppression lead to the eventual rise to power of Islamic fundamentalists in places such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, who have continuously stressed that women and men fill the roles that have been preferred for them in the Qur’an, where women stay at home and are prevented from proper education. Fundamentalists obviously considered it a requirement. As a result, women have become ignorant of their rights, and men used this to their advantage (Honarvar, 1988; Wadud, 1999).
To address the problem, more rigorous scholarly research as well as a traditionalist and rationalist interpretation of Islamic texts on part of both male and female scholars is needed to find a solution, which must obviously come from within the confines of Qur’anic revelation (Smith, 1979). However, my mere 8 pages of writing can not remedy the symptoms of governmentally reinforced sexual inequalities in Islamic countries. Rather, efforts should be made to protest against such inequalities which are promoted by errant traditions (Mernissi, 1991:49-61) and encourage intellectual debate that promotes women’s rights as they are in Islam, but which so many are (willfully) unaware of. In order for such “Islamic” governments to carry out such reforms, the post-colonialist relationship between Western and Eastern governments, which makes such reforms unfeasible, should be altered . Political reform, barring outside intervention, could then provide a suitable environment for social reform to take place.
Long story, short: Islam in practice today is prevalently misogynist, but is not in doctrine. Due partly to the lack of clarity, subtlety and depth related to the polyvalent sense of "religion" and "Islam", the response offered to the historical and cultural realities faced by Muslims in communities in the Western and/or Islamic world is wanting, and thus a more reparative and constructive relationship between the ethico-spriritual message of Islam and cultural historical reality is needed. A solution to this problem is long-term, but possible, no matter how bleak the situation today is. It will not be easy, either, but the result should be worth it: a truly Islamic society in which both men and women are equals, and doctrine and practice are truly one and the same.
Salaam, from Saracen
Notes
- Wadud became famous for leading a mixed congregation of men and women in a New York cathedral on Friday March 18, 2005. (Muslim WakeUp!)
- Ahadith is the plural form of Hadith.
- Noam Chomsky, a critic of U.S. foreign policy, asserts that the U.S. government is more focused on subduing Third-World nations for the sake of its own interests rather than promoting freedom and reform. (On The Issues)
Works Cited
Ball, J.C. "The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law." The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 1955: 46(3):347-354.
Hariri, R. "Islam's Point of View on Women's Education in Saudi Arabia." Comparative Education, 1987: 23(1):51-57.
Honarvar, N. "Behind the Veil: Women's Rights in Islamic Societies." Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 1988: 47(4):517-537.
Martin, R.C. "Understanding the Qur'an in Text and Context." History of Religions, 1982: 21(4):361-384.
Mernissi, F. Women and Islam. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991.
Said, E.W. "Orientalism Reconsidered." Cultural Critique, 1985: 1:89-107.
Smith, J.I. "Women in Islam: Equity, Equality and the Search for a Natural Order." Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 1979: 47(4):517-534.
Wadud, A. Quran and Woman: Reading the Sacred Texts from a Woman's Perspective, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
A large number of scholars argue that Islamic beliefs, exemplified by the Qur’an and Hadith, are misogynist, or bigoted towards women and their rights, especially as mothers and wives. Proponents of this argument, amongst them Family Law practitioner Nayer Honarvar, claim that the Qur’an considers men a degree (darajah) above women and commands the wife’s absolute deference to her husband’s commands, which is contradictory to the Qur’anic statement that men and women are equal (Honarvar, 1988; Qur’an, 2:228, 3:1, 4:34). This is especially true in the case of Family Law. Honarvar goes on to claim that, as a result of her biology, a housewife is restricted to child-bearing, child care and maintenance of the household, and is barred from leaving the house. In effect, women are discouraged from education and work, and can only gain economic independence through marriage (Honarvar, 1988). She claims that this stems from Qur’anic division of labor between the sexes, in which the husband obtains the family’s income via work and manages most of his households affairs, while the wife tends to raising the children and answering to her husband (Honarvar, 1988). From a historical perspective, she argues that this dominance is also rooted in the Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) choice of the patrilineal lifestyle as the basis for the Muslim family, in which the wife is restricted to breeding and caring of the household, thereby restricting her freedom of movement and right to economic independence (Honarvar, 1988). Because of this supposed male dominance over familial affairs, Honarvar concludes that the man is the focus of family law in Islam and thus disregards the independence of women let alone a legitimate means through which women can obtain such economical autonomy, hence providing ammunition to those who argue that Islamic practices are misogynistic (Honarvar, 1988).
Another area of Islamic law under constant scholarly siege is divorce. Men can make the dissolution of their marriage official by simply announcing their intent to divorce three times in a single claim; this declaration need not be written, nor be at the consent of the wife, and nor even be done in her presence (Honarvar, 1988). Women, however, can divorce via mutual consent or judicial decree, of which the latter has to be done under several circumstances, among them being the husband’s impotence, cases of any infectious venereal diseases, failure to supply economic provisions, or apostasy from Islam (Honarvar, 1988). Also, child brides who reach puberty have the choice of remaining with their husbands or leaving them (Honarvar, 1988). Despite this, women are strongly discouraged to make “play of their divorce rights”, even though men apparently can do so (Honarvar, 1988). Furthermore, upon divorce, a woman is deprived of not only companionship, but also her livelihood, (supposedly) her children (namely, males over 2 and females over 7) and purportedly her only source of income, as she has to relinquish claims to her dower as a result (Honarvar, 1988). Should she make a living, she has to remarry, beg in the streets or live as a prostitute. From an Islamic perspective, only the first option is viable, which worsens the situation of a female divorcee who can not find a suitable mate. Also, upon divorce, a woman has to wait three months before she can remarry in a period known as the ‘idda to make sure that she does not have child from her ex-husband; she is also implored to maintain her modesty and curtail interaction with males (Honarvar, 1988). The man, however, benefits with child custody, and is relatively unaffected as his source of income is his job (Honarvar, 1988). Although women’s rights are limited in marriage, it seems that the dissolution of marriage marginalizes those rights almost completely, especially when the husband is still alive.
A third issue is inheritance. While both a male and female ascendants and descendants can inherit, a woman has half the share of a man (Honarvar, 1988). This means that the more male kin a woman has, the less she and they inherit (Honarvar, 1988). Also, a woman who is permanently divorced from her husband has no claim to inheritance, even amongst her children, who can still inherit from their father (Honarvar, 1988). Once again, the woman is apparently disfavored, regardless of marital status in this case.
Before moving on to the perspective that conforms more or less to mine, I would like to point out that I have plenty of reason to believe that Honarvar’s thesis is leaning towards biased Orientalist discourse if not Orientalist itself, despite her appeals to objectivity in acknowledging the inferior status of women before the advent of Islam. Simple observation shows that most of the references are from non-Islamic sources. Orientalist discourse tends to discount the full scope of Islamic texts as legitimate sources (Said, 1985). She fails to extensively cite passages in the Qur’an and Hadith as evidence for her aforementioned claims on divorce and family law (Honarvar, 1988). Additionally, the titles of some of these sources refer to Islam as “Mohammedanism” (as is the case of H.A.R. Gibbs’ book) and Shari’a as “Mohammedan Law” (Honarvar, 1988). Orientalist sources are known for the use of the word of “Mohammedanism” to refer to Islam, which is incorrect since Islam is not about worshipping the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).
Other blemishes were found in her thesis. There are several claims that she did not cite properly, such as the claim that a wife loses custody of her children as well as visitation rights, and that the Qur’an regards men as physically and intellectually superior to women, which is untrue (Wadud, 1999); the placement of such a claim in quotation marks does not make it more convincing (Honarvar, 1988). Moreover, she tends to look more at sexual inequalities in Islamic societies than in Islamic doctrine itself. That is, rather than attacking the Islamic doctrine and ethico-spiritual principles of Islam, as she vowed to do so in her thesis, she shifts her focus on misogynyst practices and gender inequalities in Islamic societies of the past and present. For example, she cites Dr. M. Abdul-Rauf who clearly claimed from an Islamic perspective that a woman can be granted custodial rights over her children should she be morally qualified and unmarried after the divorce, to which she responds by stating that sexual inequalities in cultures would tend to dismiss such custodial rights, thereby granting them to the man (Honarvar, 1988). Note that she did not refer to the doctrine of Islam, but rather on the general case of inequalities found in all cultures and societies The rest of her flaws should be apparent as I move on to the next thesis.
Scores of Islamic scholars have argued that Islam is not biased against women in social matters. While they acknowledge that Islamic dogma comes across as misogynist on the surface, they claim that attainment of a comprehensive understanding of the Qur’an and Hadith in terms of context and content dispels such a perception (Mernissi, 1991:60-61; Smith, 1979). They argue that while men and women are equal as believers and as such committed to the same moral responsibilities required of them (Smith, 1979), the Qur’an recognizes fundamental biological and social differences between men and women, such as the ability of women to bear children (Honarvar, 1988; Wadud, 1999:70). Despite these indispensable biological inequities along with the Qur’anic preference for men as suppliers of familial income, controversial Islamic scholar and feminist Amina Wadud claims that there is no Qur’anic ruling that restricts women to the role of housewife and mother, even though she acknowledges that are preferred for her as she is best-suited for it; that is, distribution of labor does not imply inequality (Wadud, 1999:64-65). She further claims that this darajah that men have above women are for certain cases where the man is pious and supports his wife from his means, but this does not imply that men as a whole are above women as a whole (Wadud, 1999:66+68-71). In return for the wife’s obedience, the husband must in turn shoulder the burden of caring for her mental, physical and economical welfare, which means that the wife need not concern herself with familial economic affairs amongst other things (Smith, 1979). Even Honarvar admits that women are not entirely restricted to their homes, and can work and/or receive education provided that they can behave decently, attend to their maternal and house-related obligations sufficiently and work in a setting that minimizes social contact with men other than their husbands and relatives (Honarvar, 1988); single women can do this as well, but within the same confines that married women are in (Honarvar, 1988; Wadud, 1999:64-65). In fact, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) implores men and women to seek education and knowledge, regardless of marital status and age, contrary to what Honarvar asserted earlier (Hariri, 1987). Honarvar recognizes that the children of women who do not regularly attend to their maternal duties suffer from lack of proper upbringing as well, and that the intra-familial ties that bond its members can fall apart as a result, hence giving as a valid reason why the role of housewife is preferred (Honarvar, 1988). Thus, the restrictions on a married woman are not as absolute as Honarvar depicted them to be.
Returning to the already bleakly-painted picture of divorce in Islam, Honarvar did not reflect on the prospect that laws (on divorce) in essence can be deterrents (Ball, 1955). The question remains, however, what is deterred in this case. Recall Honarvar’s contention that women lose companionship (as does the man), custody rights and income. Moreover, in Islam, marriage is a contract that requires proposal on part of one party, careful consideration of the offer, and a mutual acceptance of the offer in order to ensure that the couple are willing to make their marriage work out, especially when it comes to marital disputes (Honarvar, 1988). Otherwise, divorce would be a more likely outcome. It is important, I think, that women consider such proposals as well as their potential husbands before they accept it or rush to acceptance (Smith, 1979). Thus, these divorce laws deter marital disruption, forced marriages, and hasty marriages that leave no time for consideration of the proposal. This is supported by the fact that Islam encourages men and women to marry and stay married, for marriage endorses societal chastity and cleanliness, and confines sexual pleasure to within the family (Honarvar, 1988).
The abovesaid argument can be proposed only if Honarvar’s allegations – that divorce rights are absolutely non-equitable – are true. In addition to the aforementioned rights of women regarding divorce, especially the right of divorce upon legal procedure, Wadud further cites the Qur’an in saying that divorce should be done on equitable terms without specification towards custodial rights and dowry, at the same time cautioning men on unjustly taking advantage of their wives (Wadud, 1999:78-80; Qur’an, 2:231). This seems to negate Honarvar’s earlier claims on custodial rights, for we can not know for certain. A husband is also required to support his wife during the three-month long ‘idda period, especially when he is regarded at fault (Honarvar, 1988). Moreover, men are discouraged from making “play with their divorce rights”: the Prophet (peace be upon him) said that “God does not like men and women who relish variety in sexual pleasure”. Ironically, Honarvar cited this but failed to consider its meaning as she focused on the Hadith that were aimed at women, thereby bringing into the fore another loophole in her thesis.
Following Wadud’s line of logic in the case of inheritance, it can be assumed that the double share of inheritance that men receive is compensated by the economical support of their wives and women. She further contends that the Qur’an itself does not elaborate on all possibilities of inheritance, as it requires us to take a look at the benefits of the inherited share to particulars within the family and who requires that share more than others and thereby do justice (Wadud, 1999:87-88). Also, if a woman has a brother, she is still an heir, but she receives half the share of any other man present (Wadud, 1999:87-88). As a result, the inheritance procedure does not appear clockwork and biased like it does in Honarvar’s analysis, and gives plenty of room for possibilities in which women may receive larger shares (Wadud, 1999:88).
Regardless of the rebuttal to Honarvar’s claims, Wadud is not perfect either. She seems to neglect Islamic traditions, the Ahadith , almost entirely. Proper exegesis of the Qur’an amongst mainstream Muslims involves keeping the context of the verse in mind, and the Ahadith usually serve the purpose of defining such contexts (Martin, 1982). While Honarvar rarely makes a claim based on the Qur’an, Wadud interprets the Qur’an in accordance with both the Qur’an’s “worldview” and her individual semantic “understanding” of specific words in the verses instead of relying on the consensus of the Muslim (scholarly) community, which she believes at the moment is patriarchal (and rightly so in many, but not most cases), regarding interpretation of these verses as well as the Ahadith (Wadud, 1999:62-63). Despite what I think is a much stronger argument, her work is still as subjective if not less than Honarvar’s.
The main problem today, however, lies in how Islam is practiced, not what it espouses, which is rather part of the issue that Honarvar addressed initially: the enigma of the persistence of misogyny and gender inequality in Islamic societies at the expense of the ethical and spiritual doctrines of Islam. Both Wadud and Honarvar acknowledge that Islamic societies of today, while containing equal numbers of men and women, are patriarchal in nature. The inequalities observed are rather social and cultural rather than religious (Smith, 1979). Years of colonialism and oppression lead to the eventual rise to power of Islamic fundamentalists in places such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, who have continuously stressed that women and men fill the roles that have been preferred for them in the Qur’an, where women stay at home and are prevented from proper education. Fundamentalists obviously considered it a requirement. As a result, women have become ignorant of their rights, and men used this to their advantage (Honarvar, 1988; Wadud, 1999).
To address the problem, more rigorous scholarly research as well as a traditionalist and rationalist interpretation of Islamic texts on part of both male and female scholars is needed to find a solution, which must obviously come from within the confines of Qur’anic revelation (Smith, 1979). However, my mere 8 pages of writing can not remedy the symptoms of governmentally reinforced sexual inequalities in Islamic countries. Rather, efforts should be made to protest against such inequalities which are promoted by errant traditions (Mernissi, 1991:49-61) and encourage intellectual debate that promotes women’s rights as they are in Islam, but which so many are (willfully) unaware of. In order for such “Islamic” governments to carry out such reforms, the post-colonialist relationship between Western and Eastern governments, which makes such reforms unfeasible, should be altered . Political reform, barring outside intervention, could then provide a suitable environment for social reform to take place.
Long story, short: Islam in practice today is prevalently misogynist, but is not in doctrine. Due partly to the lack of clarity, subtlety and depth related to the polyvalent sense of "religion" and "Islam", the response offered to the historical and cultural realities faced by Muslims in communities in the Western and/or Islamic world is wanting, and thus a more reparative and constructive relationship between the ethico-spriritual message of Islam and cultural historical reality is needed. A solution to this problem is long-term, but possible, no matter how bleak the situation today is. It will not be easy, either, but the result should be worth it: a truly Islamic society in which both men and women are equals, and doctrine and practice are truly one and the same.
Salaam, from Saracen
Notes
- Wadud became famous for leading a mixed congregation of men and women in a New York cathedral on Friday March 18, 2005. (Muslim WakeUp!)
- Ahadith is the plural form of Hadith.
- Noam Chomsky, a critic of U.S. foreign policy, asserts that the U.S. government is more focused on subduing Third-World nations for the sake of its own interests rather than promoting freedom and reform. (On The Issues)
Works Cited
Ball, J.C. "The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law." The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 1955: 46(3):347-354.
Hariri, R. "Islam's Point of View on Women's Education in Saudi Arabia." Comparative Education, 1987: 23(1):51-57.
Honarvar, N. "Behind the Veil: Women's Rights in Islamic Societies." Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 1988: 47(4):517-537.
Martin, R.C. "Understanding the Qur'an in Text and Context." History of Religions, 1982: 21(4):361-384.
Mernissi, F. Women and Islam. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991.
Said, E.W. "Orientalism Reconsidered." Cultural Critique, 1985: 1:89-107.
Smith, J.I. "Women in Islam: Equity, Equality and the Search for a Natural Order." Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 1979: 47(4):517-534.
Wadud, A. Quran and Woman: Reading the Sacred Texts from a Woman's Perspective, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
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