Skip to main content

Reconciliation Plan... or Another Farce?

Iraq has seen the worst case of civil disunity ever since the abrupt end of the tensions between Northern Ireland's Catholic and Protestant communities, as well as the disbanding of the IRA. However, things are looking much more murkier, and no end seems to be in sight. What I mention is of the latest proposal by the Iraqi puppet government under PPM (prime puppet minister) Maliki. You know, for a while, I had confidence in him ever since he claimed that he would launch an investigation into the Haditha killings and has himself said that he is tired of Coalition excuses for murdering innocent civilians, as per Al Jazeera's report on the issue.

However, I lost confidence when Maliki met Bush after the death of Zarqawi, and was assured that they would crush all "terrorists" and "insurgents", according to the San Francisco Chronicle. He struck me as another Jaafari, a Shi'ite who has much militia backup and cares about serving himself and his sect over others. The death of the Sunnite insurgent Zarqawi was also used as a diversionary measure to distract Maliki's attention from Haditha, and possibly other incidents in Iraq. This guy pissed me off even further when he held no investigation or called for one when several people were killed and a mother was raped by Coalition troops, according to Al Jazeera, though I'm pretty sure that the probe is going to come out fruitless, with soldiers cleared of war crimes by a farcical investigation on part of the Coalition that is already raping Iraq and her people and her resources (I can go on, but I'll stop there).

Now, this isn't the really big news. What's really come out these days is that Maliki has proposed a reconciliation plan for Iraqis, though it might end up like the Iraqi Charter, which itself did not represent all Iraqis. Taking a look at the same Al Jazeera article presented on the U.S. probe, we can see that an opinion poll shows that most people don't think that the reconciliation plan will quell violence, though I admit that polls aren't perfect. However, let's get down to the core issues. Mona Salem of the Middle East Times wrote an article on the issue surrounding this. She claimed that Sunnite leaders have already referred to this plan as another "public relations campaign" that would only serve the interests of the government and give it a better image.

The story does not end there, though. Salem writes that Maliki's Sunday-released reconciliation plan
in a bid to stem the sectarian violence ravaging Iraq's Sunni and Shia communities was "meaningless because he has excluded everyone," Muthana Hareth Al Dhari said. It also aims to encourage die-hard Sunni Arabs like Dhari who refuse to accept the rise to power of the long-oppressed Shias to abandon their sympathies for armed struggle and join the political process.
Granted, I don't take a politicians words for gold, but the plan has many flaws in that considering that Iraqi unity would be achieved, the Coalition's illegal presence would not be needed (not that it already is, but you catch my drift). This is also reminiscient, as stated above, to the Iraq Charter, which was already full of holes and did not allocate enough power to each sect; the problem with the Charter is that it treats Iraqis as sects, not as one people, and thus can't be used for any sort of reconciliation. Also, consider that most Iraqi prisoners are Sunnite. With this in mind, one can see the drastic selection by Coalition troops and the Iraqi Army under the Coalition's watch to capture Iraqi Sunnite "insurgents" (who might even be resistance fighters).

Moreover, violence still rages on in Iraq. In the midst of this violence, most Sunnite groups rejected the proposal, while only one, according to the Toronto Star, accepted it. Dhari, the hardline Sunnite leader, claimed that the Brigades of 1920 Revolution, the Rashedeen Army, Islamic Movement of Iraqi Mujahideen, United Iraqi Jihadist People (what the heck?!), and Jaish Al Mujahideen all rejected the proposal. However, setting aside the Sunnite group that bootlicked Maliki's proposal, the PPM claimed that other groups accepted it. Dhari, with respect to this sudden claim from the PPM, responded,
"Nobody knows the so-called organizations mentioned in the government mouthpiece Al-Sabah, and the armed groups mentioned are also unknown."
Note the bolded part, which just highlights the ludicruity of Maliki's claims. On a lighter note, it seems that the Sunnite parties who rejected the proposal have reasons not to be happy. Salem writes on, citing spokesmen from the Sunnite groups:
"We are not concerned by this initiative as it does not address the main problem of occupation and also the [terrorist] militias," said the Brigades of 1920 Revolution in a statement.
Think about this for a moment. This means that the supposed terrorist militias who are attacking Iraqis left and right in Baghdad and other places are not being dealt with as part of the reconciliation plan. Furthermore, this means unpredictable outcomes of disarming... Perhaps a re-inforced martial law will take place? Those who resist the government and its suckup policies will perhaps face death or torture. The Coalition troops have already been shown not to be of help and have been in fact counterproductive at times, so addressing a withdrawal is necessary should Iraq's unity be achieved; the Coalition already proved itself hazardous for Iraqi unity after inciting Shi'ite groups against Sunnite insurgents and incorporating Kurdish Peshmerga and Shi'ite hardliners into the police force. Salem then writes that
A number of militias close to Shia political parties have been blamed for the killings of Sunni Arabs. The Jaish Al Mujahideen also discarded the proposal saying that it will not "dirty its hands ... by shaking the hands of those who are with the occupiers [US-led forces]."
Sunnites have been resistant to the government ever since its inception, when it stopped caring for the Iraqi Sunnites out of senseless revenge for what Saddam did (sure, Saddam was a Sunnite, but he favored NO ONE). Shi'ite hardliners will never accept the fact that Saddam was not a selective person with respect to Iraqi Arabs. Moreover, the idea of subserving to the demands of a group that has allied itself to the Coalition (i.e. Maliki's cooperation with Bush Jr.) is humiliating as it means surrendering to U.S. demands once more.

Personally, I don't know much about this whole mess. Could the reconciliation plan be a farce? Could it be a good thing for the Iraqi people, and that Dhari might have been misled? We don't know for certain. What we do know for sure is that there is enough evidence that this plan does not comply with the values of Iraqi democracy (the voice of the Iraqi people), which the Coalition already does not care about. What I do want to see is a unified Iraq that is done by heart, not by paper like the farce of a Charter. All we have to do now is wait and see... The sooner Iraq is unified, the better it can rid itself of the Coalition occupation forces.

Salaam, from
Saracen

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

What "Culture Clash"?

I hear this all the time, and yet I still have yet to not only materialistically comprehend this prospect, but to philosophically grasp it. There are so many cultures and races that dot this earth, and yet we have seen them come and go as well. But how can cultures themselves clash? To answer this question, one should take a look at the definition of culture. The word culture , from the Latin colo, -ere, with its root meaning "to cultivate", generally refers to patterns of human activity and the symbolic structures that give such activity significance. Different definitions of "culture" reflect different theoretical bases for understanding, or criteria for evaluating, human activity. Note the definition: patterns of personal activity. Patterns by themselves are immeasurable and also immaterial. However, the only material object encountered in the definition is the set of "symbolic structures" that represent these patterns and give them significance. Cult

حول قرار حماس تشكيل قوة مشتركة من الفصائل

هذا النص يتحدث عن التشقق في الحكومة الفلسطينية, وكيف استغلوا القوات الصهيونية على التفرق بين حماس ومنظمة التخريب " فتح" التي خانت الفاسطينيون لخدمة نفسها ولخدمة "إسراءيل". تأليف د. إبراهيم علوش قرار وزير داخلية السلطة الفلسطينية، القائمة على مرجعية اتفاقية أوسلو، بتشكيل قوة مشتركة من الفصائل العسكرية الفلسطينية المقاومة، وقرار محمود عباس رئيس سلطة أوسلو بشطب قرار وزير الداخلية سعيد صيام بتشكيل تلك القوة المشتركة، أثار الكثير من التكهنات واللغط حول مغزى تلك الخطوة وأبعادها. ومثل كل قرار سياسي، هناك دائماً واجهة خارجية وأجندة خفية، خاصة عندما نتعامل مع قوى قررت أن تكون جزءاً من الواقع السائد بدلاً من الانقلاب عليه. فالانضمام لركب أوسلو، على أساس مشروع "تغييره من الداخل"، يترك المرء بالضرورة أسير مساومات لا يمكن إلا أن تمس بالثوابت وبالمرجعيات التاريخية لصراعنا مع الحركة الصهيونية منذ أكثر من قرن. وبالمقابل، فإن قرار محمود عباس بشطب قرار وزير الداخلية يرتبط بدوره بحسابات التنافس الداخلي، ليس فقط على الصلاحيات، بل على كل دوره التاريخي هو وفتح. المهم، يمكن أن ت

Book Review: "The Crusade through Arab Eyes" by Amin Maalouf

The bulk of modern history regarding the Crusades has an unashamedly Western slant to it. Even a cursory search of the word "crusade" on Amazon Books reveals a plethora of books written by authors from the U.K., the U.S., and elsewhere in the Western world, but a severe (emphasis) paucity of books from a more Arab perspective. One book that stands out is Amin Maalouf's "The Crusades through Arab Eyes", a book I believe is much-needed given the overall bias inherent in the gestalt of Western history books on this topic. The gold standard for history on the Crusades is currently the "The Oxford History of the Crusades", another book I will review in the not-so-distant future (and expect comparisons to this book given that I have completed reading it). The too-long-didn't-read version of this review is the following: if you're interested in history, buy it, read it, and keep it. Nevertheless, my full review follows. For those who are un